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shaping the way in which mitigating evidence is considered by the jury.
Johnson suggests several matters of importance to Virginia attorneys. First, this case teaches the importance of thorough investigation in
building a strong case in mitigation. 15 While the prosecution undertook
a full-scale investigation into the defendant's past and found evidence
relevant to future dangerousness in a multitude of occurrences from
relatively early childhood up to the time of the trial, the defense utilized
only the defendant's father, who testified about defendant's troubled
childhood and the impaired judgments of nineteen year-olds. The
father's testimony may have had some impact on the jurors, but the
defendant needed more to combat the damaging evidence presented by
the prosecution. Defense counsel must investigate every aspect of the
defendant's background, personality and lifestyle that may be useful as
mitigation evidence.
Virginia's capital sentencing scheme, like that of Texas, includes a
"future dangerousness" factor. 16 Virginia's sentencing scheme does not
require a mandatory death sentence upon the finding of aggravating

factors, as did the former Texas statute. 17 If Virginia defense counsel
work to ensure that the jury is made aware, through argument and jury
instructions, and by presentation of a real case in mitigation, that it has
the option to impose a life sentence, then Johnson should not be an
impediment to defense practice in Virginia.
Because Virginia juries are free to set sentence at life in prison for
any reason satisfactory to themselves, the relevance problems at issue in
Johnson are simply not present. Although it is constitutionally impermissible to limit mitigating factors to those highlighted by the legislature,
it is still permissible for Virginia defense attorneys to offer jury instructions noting that the Virginia General Assembly has specifically recog8
nized youth as mitigating. I

15 See Chipperfield, PreparingMitigation Priorto Guilt Phase,

are found. Tex. Crim. Pro. Code Ann. art. 37.071(2) (Vernon Supp.
1992-1993).
18 See Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(B)(v) (1990). But Cf. Watkins
v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 469,331 S.E.2d 422 (1985) (holding constitutional a verdict form that generally required the jury to consider
mitigation evidence, but specifically listed vileness and future dangerousness as aggravating factors).

Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 1,No.2, p. 19(1989). See also GeimerLaw
and Reality in the Capital Penalty Trial, N.Y.U. Rev. of L. & Soc.
Chan e, Vol. 18, No. 2, p. 273 (1990-1991).
f6 See Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(c) (1990).
17 The 1991 amendments to the Texas statute allow the jury to
sentence a defendant to life imprisonment even if all aggravating factors
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113 S. Ct. 1222 (1993)
United States Supreme Court

FACTS
Seventeen year-old Frederick Lashley beat and stabbed to death his
physically impaired foster mother, Janie Tracy, during the course of a
robbery. Lashley was treated as an adult under Missouri law and was
convicted of capital murder. He was sentenced to death. 1
Before the penalty phase of Lashley's trial, one of his defense
attorneys requested that the jury be instructed on the mitigating circumstance that "[t]he defendant ha[d] no significant history of prior criminal
activity." 2 The defense attorney faced a difficult dilemma. The trial
judge had informed defense counsel that he would allow the prosecution
to introduce evidence of the defendant's juvenile record if the defense
team attempted to offer evidence that Lashley had no prior criminal
record. 3 As a result, the defense attorney decided not to offer evidence
but still requested the instruction. The trial judge did not grant the
requested instruction.
The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the decision of the trial
judge not to give the instruction, reasoning that Missouri law requires

I Mo. Rev. Stat § 565.001 (Vernon 1979) (repealed Oct. 1, 1984).
2 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.012.3(1) (Vernon 1979) (current version
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.032.2(1) (Vernon Supp. 1993)).
3 This was error under Missouri law. Mo. Rev. Stat. §211.271
(Vernon 1983) (prohibiting the use of thejuvenile record for any purpose
in any proceeding other than a juvenile proceeding).
State v.Lashley, 667 S.W.2d 712,714-15 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
5 469 U.S. 873 (1984).

mitigating instructions to be supported by evidence. 4 Lashley's petition
for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was denied. 5 Lashley
then filed a habeas petition in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri, but the claim was dismissed. 6 On appeal,
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals granted relief 7 and held that the
failure to give the instruction was unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment as interpreted in Lockett v. Ohio.8 The Eighth Circuit
reasoned that because there was no evidence of prior criminal activity,
the judge should have given the instruction.9
HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court held that "to comply with due
process state courts need give jury instructions in capital cases only if the
evidence so warrants." 10 The Court went on to state that "[b]ecause the
jury heard no evidence concerning Lashley's prior criminal history, the
trialjudge did not err in refusing to give the requested instruction." 1I t Nor
did the Court accept the dissent's assertion that this holding would

6 Lashley v. Armontrout, No. 87-897(c)(2) (E.D.Mo., June 9,
1988).
7 Lashley v. Armontrout, 957 F.2d 1495 (1992).
8 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (requiring that death penalty schemes allow
the jury to consider all mitigating factors).
9 957 F.2d at 1502.
10 Delo v. Lashley, 113 S. Ct 1222, 1224 (1993) (citing Hopper v.
Evans, 456 U.S. 605 (1982)).
11 Id. at 1225.
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require the defendant to testify. 12 Instead, the Court noted that the
prosecution would have been content with testimony by acquaintances
of the defendant. 13 Finally, the Court addressed charges from the dissent
that the holding weakened the presumption of innocence: "Once the
defendant has been convicted fairly in the guilt phase of the trial the
14
presumption of innocence disappears."
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
The United States Supreme Court held in Lashley that, even
assuming the application of the presumption of innocence at a capital
penalty trial, defendants are not entitled to an instruction to any greater
degree than those that have not yet been convicted. Referring to the guilt/
innocence portion of the trial, the Court ruled that "[u]nder our precedents, the instruction would have been constitutionally required only if
the circumstances created a genuine risk that the jury would conclude,
from factors other than the state's evidence, that the defendant had
15
committed other crimes."
The fact that the defendant does not have a criminal history is a
6
statutory mitigating factor under both Missouri and Virginia law.t
Missouri, however, places the burden of proof on the defendant as to the

12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 1226.
15 Id. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786,788-89 (1979).
16 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.012.3(1) (Vernon 1979) (current version Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 565.032.2(1) (Vernon Supp. 1993)); Va. Code Ann.
§ 19.2-264.4(B)(i) (1990).

existence of this mitigating factor. It is also worth noting that, while
juries cannot be limited to consideration of only statutorily enumerated
mitigating factors, instructions should be requested to the effect that the
Virginia legislature has highlighted a certain element such as a lack of
criminal history as mitigating. 17 Itis not irrational to argue thatLashley's
holding (that no instruction is required in the absence ofevidence) means
that an instruction is required when the evidence exists.
AfterLashley, it is clear that an attorney may be forced to prove that
something did not happen. Virginia law permits counsel to offer proof
by use of any form of admissible evidence. 18 In a similar situation to
Lashley's, a defense attorney could ask the Commonwealth's attorney to
stipulate to the lack of criminal history. If the Commonwealth's attorney
refuses, the defense attorney may then subpoena the custodians of the
records in every jurisdiction where the defendant has resided in order to
prove the necessary elements.
Summary and analysis by:
Cameron P. Turner

17 These elements are found in Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(B)
(1990).
18 In Bunch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423,436-37,304 S.E.2d
271,278 (1983), the Supreme Court of Virginia held that, once the trial
court deemed the evidence (photographs of the deceased) admissible, the
defense could not preclude use ofthe pictures by offering to stipulate that
the victim had been murdered in the way that the prosecution claimed;
therefore, the prosecution had the right to offer the photographs.

SULLIVAN v. LOUISIANA
113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS

HOLDING

The Louisiana Criminal District Court, Parish ofOrleans, convicted
John Sullivan of first-degree murder in the course of committing an
armed robbery and sentenced him to death. Michael Hillhouse, a
convicted felon and his alleged accomplice, identified Sullivan at trial as
the murderer. Hillhouse testified pursuant to a grant of immunity. Of the
many people at the bar during the crime, only one - who had not been
able to identify Hillhouse or Sullivan at a lineup - testified that the two
had committed the robbery and that she had seen Sullivan hold a gun to
the victim's head. Other circumstantial evidence tended to show that
Sullivan had been the triggerman. Defense counsel argued that there was
reasonable doubt concerning both the murderer's identity and intent.
In instructing the jury, the trial judge defined "reasonable doubt" in
a way that was, as the State conceded, essentially identical to the
definition found unconstitutional in Cage v. Louisiana.1 The Supreme
Court of Louisiana held on direct appeal that the erroneous instruction
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.2 The United States Supreme
Court granted Sullivan's petition for certiorari.

The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction and held
that a constitutionally deficient reasonable doubt instruction cannot be
harmless error. 3 The Court based its holding on two settled principles.
First, the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury is fundamental. Its
most important element is the right to have the jury, not the judge, find
guilt.4 Second, the Due Process Clause requires that the prosecution bear
the burden of proving all elements of the offense and the facts necessary
5
to establish each element "beyond a reasonable doubt."

1 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam). The instruction in Cage said in
part: "It must be such doubt as would give rise to a grave uncertainty,
... It is an actual substantial doubt. ...What is required is not an
absolute or mathematical certainty, but a moral certainty." Id. at40. See

case summary of Cage,Capital DefenseDigest, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 5 (1991).
2 State v. Sullivan, 596 So.2d 177, 186 (La. 1992).
3 Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2083 (1993).
4 Id. at 2080.
5 Id. (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-364 (1970)).

ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
The Court concluded that the Sixth Amendment right to have a
jury find the defendant guilty is interrelated with the Due Process
requirement ofproof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Sixth Amendment
would be violated if ajudge were allowed to determine that the defendant
was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt after the jury had determined only
that he was probably guilty. The instruction given to the Sullivan jury

